Abstract-In this paper, we pioneer the study of physical-layer security in heterogeneous networks (HetNets). We investigate secure communications in a two-tier downlink HetNet, which comprises one macrocell and several femtocells. Each cell has multiple users and an eavesdropper attempts to wiretap the intended macrocell user. Firstly, we consider an orthogonal spectrum allocation strategy to eliminate co-channel interference, and propose the secrecy transmit beamforming only operating in the macrocell (STB-OM) as a partial solution for secure communication in HetNet. Next, we consider a secrecy-oriented non-orthogonal spectrum allocation strategy and propose two cooperative STBs which rely on the collaboration amongst the macrocell base station (MBS) and the adjacent femtocell base stations (FBSs). Our first cooperative STB is the STB sequentially operating in the macrocell and femtocells (STB-SMF), where the cooperative FBSs individually design their STB matrices and then feed their performance metrics to the MBS for guiding the STB in the macrocell. Aiming to improve the performance of STB-SMF, we further propose the STB jointly designed in the macrocell and femtocells (STB-JMF), where all cooperative FBSs feed channel state information to the MBS for designing the joint STB. Unlike conventional STBs conceived for broadcasting or interference channels, the three proposed STB schemes all entail relatively sophisticated optimizations due to QoS constraints of the legitimate users. In order to efficiently use these STB schemes, the original optimization problems are reformulated and convex optimization techniques, such as second-order cone programming and semidefinite programming, are invoked to obtain the optimal solutions. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed STB schemes are highly effective in improving the secrecy rate performance of HetNet.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid proliferation of smart phones, tablets and machine-to-machine communications, there is an everincreasing demand for seamless wireless coverage, extremely high mobile data rate and reliable secrecy performance [1] . Aiming to effectively enhance the spectral and/or energy efficiency of wireless networks, it has been suggested that the Manuscript received July 24, 2014; revised December 17, 2014 ; accepted February 19, 2015. This work is financially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) (Grant No. 61271188 and Grant No. deployment density of various network-nodes should increase [2] , [3] , and smart access-point activation and resource management are essential to utilize the dense network-nodes [4] . Therefore, heterogeneous network (HetNet) [5] , [6] has been attracting great research interests, and it is regarded as one of the most promising techniques for providing higher network capacity and wider coverage. HetNet is supported by various types of base stations with different transmit power budgets. Macrocell base stations (MBSs) provide public access and wide area coverage up to a few kilometers to all the marcocell users (MUs). Small cell base stations, such as femtocell base stations (FBSs), are typically overlaid on the existing macrocells and installed in the building or indoor environment close to femtocell users (FUs). It is noted that the network architecture of HetNet becomes more open and diverse compared to the conventional single-tier cellular networks, which makes the information exchange more susceptible to eavesdropping. Recently, physical-layer security (PLS) has been proposed as a family of viable techniques to secure wireless communications [7] , [8] , and it also has the potential to tackle the security problem encountered in HetNet.
Traditionally, the security problem in wireless networks was mainly studied at higher layers using key-based cryptographic methods [9] . This conventional wisdom relies on the assumption that the eavesdropper is not computationally powerful to break the secret key. However, as the computational capability of wireless devices develops rapidly, perfect security can be hardly guaranteed with the key-based solutions. It is reasonable to argue that security measures should be invoked at all layers where they can be implemented in a cost-effective manner. Notably, the physical layer has remained almost ignored for security in the past. The basic idea of PLS is to exploit the randomness of wireless channel for secure message transmission [10] . The authors in [8] , [11] , [12] investigated the PLS in single-antenna fading channels. Since then, the secure communication in multi-antenna channels has been extensively studied [13] - [19] and in particular, practical and robust multi-antenna secrecy beamforming schemes were investigated in [19] very recently. Secure broadcasting with more than two receivers were considered in [20] - [22] . Other related works in the contexts of the multiple-access channel with confidential messages [23] , the multiple-access channel wiretap channel [24] , and the cognitive multipleaccess channel with confidential messages [25] have also been reported. Recently, there are growing research interests in the secrecy communication over interference channels, where the interference may be potentially exploited for improving the secrecy performance. More specifically, in [26] , the authors studied the inner and outer bounds for the secrecy capacity regions of a two-user interference network where the receivers are potentially eavesdroppers. The secrecy rate of a twouser interference network with an outer eavesdropper was investigated in [27] . The MIMO Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages was studied in [28] using gametheoretic approach. The authors of [29] addressed the problem of minimizing the transmit power with imperfect channel state information (CSI) in a K-user multiple-input single-output interference network, and the so-called "S-procedure" was applied. It should be noted that the existing works on PLS mainly focus on traditional network architectures, and the research on PLS for HetNet is still largely missing.
Because of the densely overlaid network architecture, there is ubiquitous interference of various types existing in HetNet [30] . From the viewpoint of PLS, deliberately introducing interference can be beneficial for the secrecy rate performance of the system [10] . Inspired by this insight, the interference should be utilized, rather than avoided, to improve the secrecy rate in HetNet using techniques such as proper spectrum allocation and cooperative beamforming. To elaborate a little further, motivated by the inter-cell interference coordination techniques [31] - [35] , spectrum allocation can be rearranged dynamically in conjunction with various levels of cooperation between the network nodes, such as the MBS and FBSs, to generate the desired co-channel interference (CCI) to the eavesdropper. As a result, judicious cooperative beamforming schemes may be designed to cope with CCI for the sake of improving the secrecy rate performance in HetNet.
In this paper, a two-tier downlink HetNet system is considered, where MBS and FBSs serve the corresponding legitimate MUs and FUs, and a MU acts maliciously as an eavesdropper to wiretap another legitimate MU. For the considered scenario, we propose three secrecy transmit beamforming (STB) schemes in conjunction with two spectrum allocation schemes for secure communications in the HetNet, assuming different degrees of cooperation among the network nodes. As an initial study, we first consider the conventional orthogonal spectrum allocation (OSA) strategy [36] , where orthogonal spectrum resources are allocated to the MBS and the adjacent FBSs to eliminate the cross-tier interference and the interference among adjacent femtocells. Employing OSA, the considered scenario can be simplified as the secure communication in a broadcasting channel, and we consider the STB only performed in macrocell (STB-OM) as a partial solution for the secure communication in HetNet. It is noted that STB-OM aims to maximize the secrecy rate of the intended MU subject to the Quality of Service (QoS) constraints of the other legitimate MUs; no cooperation between the MBS and FBSs is necessary. Inspired by the fact that friendly interference can help secure communication [10] , we deliberately introduce interference in the HetNet with the secrecy-oriented non-orthogonal spectrum allocation (SONOSA) strategy, which dynamically changes the local pattern of the underlay OSA. Specifically, some cooperative FBSs adjacent to the eavesdropper are assigned with the same frequency resource as MBS, while the OSA strategy still applies to the non-cooperative FBSs. Consequently, CCI is deliberately introduced around the eavesdropper to enable more effective cooperative STB. Specifically, two STB schemes are proposed in conjunction with SONOSA, where MBS performs STB in collaboration with its cooperative co-channel FBSs. Firstly, a STB scheme is proposed to improve STB-OM with a little cross-tier cooperation, which is sequentially performed in macrocell and femtocells (STB-SMF). In this scheme, each cooperative FBS designs its STB to altruistically maximize the generated interference to the eavesdropper while serving its own FUs. Then each cooperative FBS calculates a performance metric and feeds it back to the MBS to facilitate the STB in macrocell, and the MBS can still use the STB-OM with minor modification. In order to improve the overall performance of STB-SMF, another STB is proposed with the limited crosstier cooperation, which is jointly performed in macrocell and femtocells (STB-JMF). In this scheme, each cooperative FBS feeds its CSI back to the MBS for the joint STB, which aims to guarantee the QoS requirements of both MUs and FUs while enhancing the secrecy rate of the intended MU.
For the sake of clarity, the main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: 1) Upon adopting the OSA strategy, an STB-OM scheme is proposed to secure the broadcast channel of the macrocell, where the confidential message and the common messages are simultaneously transmitted. In particular, an iterative algorithm is proposed to maximize the secrecy rate while satisfying the QoS of the common messages. In order to handle the complicated optimization problem, we transform the original nonconvex problem into a second-order cone program (SOCP) with the aid of a first-order Taylor approximation. The approximation can be improved with each iteration. Therefore, a local optimum of the original optimization problem can be obtained in several iterations. It is noted that the proposed STB-OM is different from the conventional STB schemes in the broadcasting channel [37] , [38] , where only the confidential message transmission is considered. Furthermore, the STB-OM is applicable to the general single cell scenarios and does not need cooperation between the MBS and FBSs, which also initiates our cooperative STB exploiting CCI. 2) Based on the SONOSA strategy, a STB-SMF scheme is proposed to improve the secrecy rate of STB-OM while guaranteeing the QoS requirements of legitimate MUs. Different from the traditional jamming sources [39] , the cooperative FBSs still serve their FUs while helping the MBS. In order to enhance the secrecy rate performance of the intended MU, the cooperative FBSs selflessly increase the interference power towards the eavesdropper without considering the QoS of their FUs, and the optimization problem is efficiently solved by SOCP. It is worth pointing out that each cooperative FBS designs its STB with local CSI, and only a scalar is fed back to the MBS for its STB in macrocell, where the MBS can still adopt STB-OM. Therefore, the STB-SMF scheme imposes very little overhead for the cross-tier cooperation, and is compatible with STB-OM. 3) Employing SONOSA strategy, an STB-JMF scheme is proposed to strike a better balance between the secretrate performance of the intended MUs and the QoS requirements of the legitimate MUs and FUs. It is noted that such complicated optimization is nonconvex, and we opt for reformulating it into a tractable twostage problem. Specifically, we first fix the signal-tointerference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the eavesdropper to formulate the inner stage problem, which can be further transformed into a tractable semidefinite program (SDP) by applying the semidefinite relaxation technique. Then, we perform a one-dimensional search to solve the outer stage problem, which finds the most suitable SINR of the eavesdropper to optimize the original objective. It is noted that the MBS only needs to collect the CSI from its cooperative FBSs for this joint STB, and such crosstier cooperation imposes acceptable overhead for the backhaul. Furthermore, unlike the altruistic STB of the cooperative FBSs in STB-SMF, the STB-JMF shceme guarantees the QoS of the FUs in the cooperative FBSs. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the downlink HetNet system model and the corresponding spectrum allocation strategies are presented, and we derive SINR expressions of various network nodes for the following beamforming design. Based on the two spectrum allocation strategies, three STB schemes are proposed in Section III, where the related optimization problems are formulated and solved. In Section IV, simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms. Finally, conclusions and future directions are provided in Section V.
N otations: Bold upper and lower case letters denote matrices and vectors, respectively. Transpose and conjugate transpose are denoted by (·) T and (·) H , respectively, while E {·} represents expectation. Tr (·) is the trace operator, · represents the Euclidean norm, | · | denotes the mode of a complex number, and rank (·) stands for the rank of a matrix. X 0 indicates that X is Hermitian positive semidefinite. C represents the field of complex numbers. Re (·) and Im (·) denote the real part and the imaginary part of a complex number, respectively. Additionally, the integer set {1, 2, . . . , K} is abbreviated as [1, K] . CN µ, σ 2 denotes a complex Gaussian variable with mean µ and variance σ 2 .
II. SYSTEM MODEL We consider a downlink HetNet as shown in Fig. 1 . There is one N M -antenna MBS at the center, and M single-antenna MUs are randomly distributed throughout the macrocell coverage area, where we have N M > M , while the single-antenna eavesdropper intends to wiretap the confidential message transmitted to a legitimate MU. Additionally, F N F -antenna FBSs are spatially distributed according to a homogeneous Poisson point process and each FBS aims to serve K single-antenna FUs, where we have N F > K. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the transmit power of each FBS is fixed and equal, denoted by P F . Similar to that of the FBSs, the transmit power of the MBS is assumed to be P M . Other relevant variables are defined in Table 1 .
Two spectrum allocation strategies are developed in this paper, i.e., the OSA strategy and the SONOSA strategy. Serving as the underlay spectrum allocation strategy, OSA allocates orthogonal spectrum resources to the MBS and the adjacent FBSs to eliminate the cross-tier interference as well as the interference among adjacent femtocells [36] . Building upon OSA, SONOSA dynamically changes the local pattern of OSA to enable advanced cooperative STB schemes. Specifically, the SONOSA strategy assigns the same frequency resource occupied by the MBS to the FBSs which are adjacent to the eavesdropper, as shown in Fig. 2 . Employing SONOSA, the co-channel FBSs can work in collaboration with the MBS to generate interference to the eavesdropper while serving their own FUs. Considering SONOSA, we assume that there are N (1 ≤ N < F ) cooperative FBSs employing CCI to improve the secrecy rate of the eavesdropped MU. Let us denote the n-th cooperative FBS of the MBS as FBS n and the m-th MU as Fig. 2 . An example for OSA and SONOSA, where the polygons with the same color denote the femtocells with the same frequency resource, the applegreen triangle is MBS, the cell phone is the eavesdropped MU and the ear denotes the eavesdropper. It is noted that OSA is the underlay strategy, and SONOSA dynamically changes the local pattern of OSA. Three apple-green femtocells are assigned with the same frequency resource as the macrocell to generate CCI against the eavesdropper.
MU m , then the received signal at MU m is given by
where h m ∈ C 1×NM and h n,m ∈ C 1×NF denote the channel vector from the MBS to MU m and the channel vector from the FBS n to MU m , respectively. 1 w m ∈ C NM ×1 and s m represent the precoding vector and the message symbol intended for MU m , respectively. Similarly, w nk ∈ C NF ×1 and s nk are the precoding vector and the message signal intended for the k-th FU of the n-th cooperative FBS, denoted as FU nk . n m is the Gaussian noise following independent and identically distributed (i.i. w nk 2 = P F . Without loss of generality, we assume that there is an eavesdropper wiretapping MU 1 2 , therefore the received signal 1 In this paper, we just assume perfect CSI as our first step to get fundamental insights into the physical layer security problem in HetNet. We will consider a more practical model including imperfect CSI in our future work. 2 Similar to [40] , we focus on the beamforming design in this paper. The identification problem -how to identify which MU has been intercepted by the eavesdropper -is challenging and important, which will be investigated in detail in our future work. In principle, this problem can be solved by authentication: the MBS may broadcast some test messages to each MU in a round-robin manner, and ask each of them to feed back what has been listened. For the wiretapped MU, the MBS will receive feedback from two sources.
at the eavesdropper is given by
where h E ∈ C 1×NM denotes the channel vector from the MBS to the eavesdropper, h n,E ∈ C 1×NF is the channel vector from FBS n to the eavesdropper, and n E is the Gaussian noise obeying i.i.d. CN 0, σ 2 E at the eavesdropper. Furthermore, the received signal at FU nk can be formulated as
where h n,nk ∈ C 1×NF is the channel vector from FBS n to FU nk , h nk ∈ C 1×NM is the channel vector form MBS n to FU k , and the Gaussian noise n nk at FU nk follows i.i.d.
To facilitate the analysis of secrecy rate performance, we define the SINR of MU m as
where
Similarly, the SINR of the eavesdropper is represented as
and IFT sum is the sum of the additional interference temperature from all the cooperative FBSs to the eavesdropper. Finally, the SINR of the FU nk is written as
After the above preliminary derivations, we will propose three STB schemes in the next section to maximize the secrecy rate of the intended MU 1 .
MBS Eavesdropped MU
Eavesdropper Legitimate MU Fig. 3 . An example channel model for the STB-OM scheme, consisting of one MBS, M = 2 MUs and one eavesdropper wiretaps the first MU. As the OSA is employed, the system is equivalent to a broadcast system. The solid lines indicate useful data streams, and the dash line indicates the interference stream.
III. SECURITY TRANSMIT BEAMFORMING SCHEMES FOR HETNET
In this section, we propose three secrecy communication schemes to improve the secrecy rate of HetNet by jointly considering the spectrum allocation strategy and the transmit beamforming. Firstly, based on the OSA strategy, we propose the STB-OM scheme as a partial solution for secure communication in HetNet. Then, we employ the SONOSA strategy to propose the STB-SMF scheme, which improves STB-OM with secrecy-oriented CCI generated by the altruistic cooperative FBSs. At last, aiming at a balanced system performance, we propose the STB-JMF scheme, which optimizes the securityrate of the intended MU while satisfying the QoS constraints of both legitimate MUs and FUs. In the remaining part of this section, we will discuss each STB scheme in detail. Note that in all the three proposed schemes, we assume that the local CSI of the MUs and of the eavesdropper is available at the MBS 3 , and each FBS knows the local CSI of its own femtocell.
A. Secrecy Transmit Beamforming Only Performed in Macrocell (STB-OM)
Let us first discuss the STB-OM scheme that relies on the OSA strategy. Because different frequency resources are allocated to the MBS and FBSs, no CCI exists in this scheme. As shown in Fig. 3 , the MBS serves multiple legitimate MUs, and we assume that MU 1 is wiretapped by the eavesdropper. Our goal is to maximize the secrecy rate of MU 1 while guaranteeing the QoS, i.e., SINR, requirements of other legitimate MUs. The proposed STB-OM scheme is aiming at the secrecy rate maximization. Unfortunately, this optimization problem, formulated as (7a) to (7c), is non-convex and hence prohibitive computational complexity may be incurred for finding its optimum solution. As a compromise, we employ a low-complexity iterative algorithm [41] which conservatively approximates the original problem as several tractable SOCP subproblems. In the remaining part of this subsection, the details of the problem formulation and solution are provided.
Initially, the secrecy rate optimization problem of STB-OM can be formulated as
where the received SINRs from (4) and (5), that are associated with MU m and the eavesdropper, can be simplified as
and
respectively, when the OSA strategy is adopted. Note that the IFT sum in this STB-OM is zero, because OSA does not introduce CCI. The constraint (7b) is the QoS requirements of the other legitimate MUs, i.e., MU m , m ∈ [2, M ], and (7c) represents the total transmit power constraint at the MBS. To make the above problem more tractable, we introduce a pair of slack variables t 1 and t 2 . Then, the original problem can be equivalently reformulated as
Without loss of generality, in the following, we assume σ
Substituting (8) and (9) into the above problem, (10) can be transformed as follows
where we introduce the matrices
It is noted the logarithm function is removed because of its monotonically increasing property. As we can see, the right-hand side of the constraints (11b) and (11c) are both quadratic-over-linear functions which are convex [42] . However, both constraints remain non-convex because they are expressed as the form of f 1 (x) ≤ f 2 (x), namely f 1 (x) − f 2 (x) ≤ 0, where f 1 (x) and f 2 (x) are both convex functions. More specifically, it is well known that the sum of convex functions is convex. Then, f 1 (x)−f 2 (x) is non-convex. Following the idea of the constrained convex procedure [41] , we replace these quadratic-over-linear functions with their corresponding first-order expansions, and then the problem can be transformed into a convex one. Specifically, we define
where x ≥ a, A 0. The first-order Taylor expansion of (12) at a certain point (w,x) is given by
Furthermore, it is noted that max t 1 t 2 can transformed into a SOCP representation, e.g., max t 0 with an additional con-
This transformation is based on the fact that the constraint
, where we have t 1 ≥ 0 and t 2 ≥ 0. Based on the above preparations, for the point (w,x), the problem (11) can then be transformed into a convex optimization problem as follows
Eventually, the problem can be converted to the following SOCP form (15) where the linear functions g 1 , g 2 , g 3m are respectively defined as
It is noted the SOCP (15) can be solved efficiently by using the available solvers such as CVX [43] . The proposed STB-OM scheme is summarized by Algorithm 1 as follows.
Algorithm 1 STB-OM 1) Initialization: Setw m ,t 1 andt 2 as the values which are feasible to the problem (15). 2) Repeat:
Solve the SOCP problem (15) with (w m ,t 1 ,t 2 ) and obtain the optimal values (w *
3) Until the convergence threshold is satisfied or the maximize number of iterations is reached. 4) Output w m .
The original optimization problem of STB-OM is nonconvex and NP-hard, thus its global optimum cannot be obtained with polynomial computational complexity using any known algorithm. By contrast, the proposed scheme, which is described by Algorithm 1, employs the first order Taylor approximations to transform the original optimization problem into a convex optimization problem. The globally optimal solution of the resultant convex optimization problem can be obtained upon using Algorithm 1, which, according to [41] , can be proved to converge to a local optimum of the original optimization problem in a few steps 4 .
Remark 1. Since the optimization problem defined in (15) is convex, the optimal solutions {w *
, are obtained by solving (15) for a given (w m ,t 1 ,t 2 ). At each iteration, (w m ,t 1 ,t 2 ) is updated based on the optimal solution (w * m , t * 1 , t * 2 ) obtained in the previous iteration. Hence, (w m ,t 1 ,t 2 ) is always a feasible solution of the current iteration, and the value of t 0 obtained for the given (w m ,t 1 ,t 2 ) will be larger than or equal to the value of t 0 of the previous iteration. This observation reveals that the required secrecy rate will be monotonically increasing (or at least nondecreasing) at each iteration, which is demonstrated by the numerical results in Fig. 4 . Due to the power constraint, there is an upper bound for the achievable secrecy rate. Therefore, the convergence of the proposed Algorithm 1 can be guaranteed.
Remark 2. It is clear that for the STB-OM, only the local CSI is required at the MBS, including the CSI of MUs and the CSI of the eavesdropper.
Remark 3. If an FU in a femtocell is wiretapped by another FU in the same femtocell, the problem is mathematically identical to that we have solved in this subsection. In other words, the proposed approach is applicable to general singlecell interference-free scenarios. 
B. Secrecy Transmit Beamforming Sequentially Performed in Macrocell and Femtocell (STB-SMF)
Compared to the conventional transmit beamforming without the consideration of secrecy, the secrecy rate performance of MU 1 can be improved by the STB-OM for its clear objective. In fact, we may further improve the secrecy rate performance by designing more sophisticated approaches. As shown in [44] , it is potentially feasible to exploit interference for improving the secrecy rate performance. In order to achieve this goal, judicious interference management schemes could be developed. To justify these assumptions, a secrecy-oriented spectrum allocation strategy, i.e., the proposed SONOSA, is invoked to introduce deliberate CCI that is friendly with respect to the secrecy rate performance of MU 1 . The SONOSA strategy dynamically changes the local pattern of the underlay OSA to improve the performance of STB-OM. Based on SONOSA, the cooperative co-channel FBSs can act independently as the sources of friendly CCI to degrade the performance of the eavesdropper. Specifically, the cooperative FBSs selflessly 4 The performance gap between Algorithm 1 and the optimal scheme cannot be provided at this stage due to the difficulty of obtaining the global optimum of the original optimization problem. Nevertheless, when proper initial values are given (although this is challenging as well), the local optimum achieved by Algorithm 1 may be equal to the global optimum of the original problem. Here, as shown in Fig. 4 , we develop a novel STB-SMF scheme to exploit the interference in HetNet with SONOSA. In what follows, we first discuss the STB design for the nth cooperative FBS FBS n , n ∈ [1, N ]. We consider that FBS n transmits data streams in the null space of
M×NF , which is the collective channels from FBS n to all legitimate MUs. To guarantee the existence of the null space, N M > N F > M has to be satisfied. As a consequence, the interference from FBS n would only degrade the eavesdropper's channel. In order to improve the secrecy rate, we aim at maximizing the interference from FBS n to the eavesdropper subject to the transmit power constraint. The problem can be then formulated as follows
where H n,E = h H n,E h n,E , W n = [w n,1 , w n,2 , . . . , w n,K ], and G n W n = 0 ensures that FBS n does not generate interference to the legitimate MUs. In order to eliminate the inter-cell inter-user interference of the K FUs served by FBS n , the beamforming vectors of FBS n should also satisfy w H n,k h n,nt = 0, k, t ∈ [1, K], k = t. Let us define w n,k = V n x n,k , where the columns of V n constitute an orthogonal basis for the null space of G n . The optimization problem (19) is then equivalent to
where we have R 1n = V H n H n,E V n , and R 2n = V H n V n . The above problem can be further transformed into a SOCP problem by introducing a slack variable α as follows
As we can see, the problem (21) is a standard SOCP problem and can be solved efficiently via some numerical solvers, such as CVX [43] . For some special case, we can even obtain the closed-form solution. For example, when the number of FU served by FBS n is 1, i.e., K = 1, the problem (20) can be simplified as
The optimal solution of (22) is given by x * n,1 = αφ max (R 1n , R 2n ), where φ max (R 1n , R 2n ) denotes the generalized eigenvector corresponding to the largest generalized eigenvalue of the matrix pair (R 1n , R 2n ) and α = √
. The optimal value of the objective function (22) is P F λ max (R 1n , R 2n ), where λ max (R 1n , R 2n ) is the largest generalized eigenvalue of matrix pair (R 1n , R 2n ). As a result, the optimal beamforming vector can be expressed as w * n,1 = V n x * n,1 . After designing the STB at the cooperative FBSs, we continue to design the STB at the MBS. It is noted that based on the interference temperature generated by the cooperative FBSs (cf. (5)), we can obtain the STB of the MBS by employing the STB-OM with minor modification. Specifically, let us define the interference temperature generated by FBS n at the eavesdropper as
then the sum of such interference from all N cooperative FBSs is IFT sum = N n=1 IFT n . It should be noted that IFT sum is calculated by the MBS, after receiving the feedback about IFT n from FBS n . Then the MBS performs STB according to STB-OM and IFT sum . For clarity, the proposed STB-SMF is summarized by Algorithm 2 as follows. Remark 4. It is worth mentioning that each cooperative FBS only needs to send a scalar IFT sum to the MBS in this scheme. Hence, STB-SMF only incurs a small increase of the backhaul traffic loads. Furthermore, only the local CSI is required at each FBS. In contrast, the local CSI and the interference temperature are required at the MBS.
Remark 5. In the STB-SMF, we take the QoS constraints of MUs into consideration while the QoS of FUs is ignored. In other words, we do not intend to ensure or enhance the QoS of FUs. Transmit beamforming vectors are designed for the cooperative FBSs to improve the secrecy rate of the eavesdropped MU, and no interference is generated to the other MUs. The STB-SMF is an altruistic manner from the view point of the FBSs. A more practical scheme is developed in the next subsection, where the QoS of FUs is considered. Despite this fact, the STB-SMF proposed in this subsection serves as a preliminary scheme which provides us the first insight into the interference-aided physical layer security enhancement in HetNet. Furthermore, the STB-SMF scheme also acts as a design alternative for achieving the tradeoff between the performance and the implementation complexity. Compared to the practical scheme proposed in the next subsection, less cooperation and computation are required by the STB-SMF.
C. Secrecy Transmit Beamforming Jointly Performed in Macrocell and Femtocell (STB-JMF)
In the STB-SMF scheme, CCI is deliberately introduced and exploited. The secrecy rate performance of MU 1 is thus enhanced, and the QoS of the other MUs is also guaranteed. Nevertheless, the QoS of the co-channel FUs is ignored, which implies that we cannot ensure the sum-rate performance of the FUs of the cooperative FBSs. In this section, we propose a joint secrecy transmit beamforming scheme named STB-JMF to improve the secrecy rate of MU 1 while ensuring the QoS of the other MUs and FUs. Note that the SONOSA is also used in the STB-JMF scheme in order to take advantage of the CCI from the point of secrecy. Our goal is to maximize the secrecy rate of MU 1 subject to the MBS/FBSs transmit power constraints and the SINR requirements at the other MUs and FUs. The transmit beamforming vectors of both the MBS and the cooperative FBSs are optimized jointly. To be more specific, each cooperative FBS obtains its local CSI and then sends it to the MBS. As a result, global CSI becomes available at the MBS. Then, the MBS jointly optimizes the beamforming vectors with the aid of the global CSI.
Following the analysis in the previous sections, we can formulate the original optimization problem as
where (24b) characterizes the total transmit power constraints at the MBS and the cooperative FBSs, (24c) is the QoS requirement of intact user m in the macrocell, and (24d) is the QoS requirement of FU nk . As we can see, the optimization problem is non-convex and hence is very hard to solve. [45] to simplify the problem. First, we introduce a slack variable τ = SINR E , and (24) can be equivalently transformed into
nk are respectively defined as
Tr(H n,1 W nk ) + 1, (26)
Tr(H n,E W nk ) + 1, (28)
To solve the problem (25), we divided it into two parts. The outer part is a one-dimensional line search problem with τ , i.e.,
The function G(τ ) is defined by another optimization problem to be described later. The lower bound about τ can be obtained directly from (25f), while the upper bound is derived from the fact that the secrecy rate is greater than or equal to zero, hence τ ≤ Tr(H 1 )P M . For a fixed τ , the inner part can be expressed as
Tr( and G(τ ) is equal to the optimal value of (31).
It is observed that the problem (30) is equivalent to the original problem (25) . For any fixed τ , we can obtain G(τ ) by solving (31) . Then, applying the one-dimensional line search method, e.g. Golden Section Search, to the interval [1, 1 + Tr(H 1 )P M ], we can solve the problem (25) . Hence, the key step is to solve (31) for a fixed τ . In what follows, we will concentrate on it.
Since, the objective function of (31) is a linear fractional function and thus it is quasi-convex [46] , then we can use Charnes-Cooper transformation [47] to convert it into a linear one. Upon introducing the auxiliary variables X m , X nk 0, ζ > 0, we can rewrite W m and W nk as W m = Xm ζ , W nk = X nk ζ , then the problem (31) can be transformed into the problem (32) .
It can be seen that the problem (32) is an SDP problem [45] , which can be solved efficiently by using numerical solvers such as CVX [43] . The optimal solution of the problem (32) Let us denote the optimal solution of the problem (30) as (W m ,W nk ). Then, we can obtain the beamforming vector solution as follows: if rank(W m ) = 1, the optimal beamforming vectorw m is exactly obtained via eigenvalue decomposition; otherwise some rank-one approximation procedures, e.g. Gaussian randomization [48] can be applied toW m for obtainingw m . The same procedure is applicable toW nk . For the sake of clarity, the proposed STB-JMF is summarized in Algorithm 3. (32) is always rank-one. Proof: Please see Appendix. Proposition 1 shows that using semidefinite relaxation is always tight and yields a rank-one solution for the STB-JMF.
Remark 6. In the STB-JMF, not only the QoS of MUs but also the QoS of FUs are taken into consideration. In other words, we can guarantee the QoS of all the legitimate users in both the macrocell and the cooperative femtocells. This is pragmatically attractive because QoS is one of the most important performance metrics for practical HetNet.
Remark 7. The STB-JMF scheme is capable of satisfying the QoS requirements as well as enhancing the secrecy rate performance of the eavesdropped MU, which is in contrast to the sole beamforming in STB-OM and the sequential beamforming in STB-SMF. The cooperative FBSs need to share their local CSI with the MBS. The CSI of all the MUs and FUs are available at the MBS, so that the transmit beamforming vectors for the MBS and FBSs are all designed at the MBS. Then, the MBS delivers the related beamforming matrices to the cooperative FBSs.
Remark 8. The proposed three STB schemes exploit the cooperation among network nodes in varying degrees. In the STB-OM scheme, no cooperation is used. In STB-SMF, each cooperative FBS designs transmit beamforming vectors separately for the sake of enhancing the secrecy rate performance of the eavesdropped MU. A scalar needs to be fed back to the MBS from each cooperative FBS to assist the secrecy beamforming at the MBS. In STB-JMF, all the cooperative FBSs have to share the CSI with the MBS, and the transmit beamforming vectors for the MBS and FBSs are jointly designed at the MBS to satisfy universal QoS requirements, which cannot be supported by the STB-OM and STB-SMF schemes. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that no data sharing is required for any of the proposed STB schemes, which ensures low traffic load on the backhaul links.
Remark 9. Based on [49] , we derive the computational complexity of the proposed algorithms as follows. Firstly, the computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is
Since Algorithm 2 is based on Algorithm 1 and the only difference is that Algorithm 2 has to first calculate the interference caused by each FBS, the computational complexity of Algorithm 2 is then characterized by
. Finally, Algorithm 3 is based on SDP and one-dimensional line search, and its computational complexity is
, where ǫ denotes the accuracy requirement, T I is the number of iterations required in Algorithm 1 and 2, and T S is the number of searches carried out in Algorithm 3. As we can see, the computational complexity of Algorithm 3 is higher than that of Algorithm 1 and 2.
Remark 10. It is easy to extend the proposed schemes to the scenario where there are multiple eavesdroppers. The only difference is that the resultant optimization problem has to consider the SINR constraints of multiple eavesdroppers. Then, we can use the proposed algorithms to solve them. For the scenario where multiple legitimate MUs are targeted by the eavesdroppers, we may maximize either the secrecy sum-rate of the network or the minimum secrecy rate of the legitimate MUs, and the process of solving them is similar to the proposed algorithms.
Tr(H nk X m ) + ζ , (32e)
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, simulation results are provided to evaluate the secrecy rate of MU 1 for different transmit beamforming schemes conceived. We consider a downlink HetNet with a central MBS serving a circular region C and the area of C is denoted as C. We suppose the radius of C is 500m. The FBSs are spatially distributed according to a Poisson point process ϕ f with intensity λ f [50] . Therefore, the average number of FBSs within the cellular coverage is given by N F BS = λ f C. Femtocells are derived from the Voronoi tessellation and we can attain the stochastic geometry model [36] for the cellular systems illustrated in Fig. 2 . The simplified system models of the three proposed STB schemes have been illustrated by Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 , respectively. In all simulations, the antenna configurations of the MBS and the FBS are N M = 10 and N F = 4, respectively. The number of MUs is M = 2, and the number of FUs in each FBS is K = 1. We also assume all MUs, FUs and the eavesdropper are single-antenna nodes due to practical constraint. For STB-SMF and STB-JMF schemes, we assume there are two cooperative FBSs helping improve the secrecy rate 5 , and each cooperative FBS serves one FU. According to the ITU-R channel simulation specifications [51] , we assume that the MBS has larger transmit power than the FBSs and the specific numerical values are given in the following. Moreover, the channel is modeled as a Rayleigh fading channel in all the simulations.
A. Benchmark Scheme
The benchmark scheme is designed as follows. First, we aim to maximize the rate of the wiretapped MU, i.e., MU 1 , without the consideration of secrecy, and obtain the nonsecrecy-oriented beamforming vectors for the legitimate MUs and the FUs within the cooperative femtocells. Then, we derive the secrecy rate of MU 1 with the non-secrecy-oriented beamforming vectors, which serves as our benchmark scheme. To be more specific, this optimization problem can be expressed as
where (33b) characterizes the transmit power constraint at the MBS and FBSs, while (33c) and (33d) represent the QoS requirements of the legitimate MUs and the FUs, respectively. Note that this nonconvex problem can be transformed into an SDP problem, which is convex, by dropping a rank-one constraint that emerges in the transformation process and has the form of rank(X) = 1. For more details, please refer to the process of transforming the problem (31) into the problem (32) . Upon finishing the optimization, we can obtain the secrecy rate of MU 1 . This scheme has been considered by [15], [28] . Fig. 7 shows the comparison results regarding MU 1 's secrecy rate performances with different schemes for P F = 40dB. Because the wiretapped MU 1 receives more power but the received noise power does not rise when the transmit power of the MBS increases, so we can observe that the secrecy rate performance of all the four schemes grow as the transmit power of MBS increases. It is also shown that the secrecy rates of the proposed three STB schemes always increase faster than the benchmark scheme, especially when the transmit power of the MBS is high (e.g., 42dBm and 45dBm). Obviously, the secrecy rate performance of STB-JMF and STB-SMF is better than that of STB-OM. This observation verifies that the deliberately introduced interference is capable of enhancing enhance the secrecy rate performance of the eavesdropped MU. Furthermore, it is worth noting that R s of STB-SMF slightly outperforms STB-JMF at all the transmit power values of the MBS, since STB-SMF does not consider the QoS of FUs. Fig. 8 illustrates the secrecy rate of MU 1 for the STB-SMF and STB-JMF schemes under various FBS transmit power values. It is shown that in all schemes the secrecy rate of MU 1 improves as we increase the transmit power of FBS. Note that the benchmark scheme could finally catch up our schemes at the cost of very high FBS power. However, even with little transmit power at each FBS, the proposed schemes can achieve very high secrecy rate, which is in sharp contract to the benchmark scheme. This indicates that STB-SMF and STB-JMF are able to achieve a better R s without the need to increase the transmit power of each cooperative FBS. In order to better illustrate the behaviors of STB-SMF and STB-JMF, we plot the secrecy rate of MU 1 versus the transmit power of the MBS and one cooperative FBS in a three-dimensional figure in Fig. 9 , where we can observe the variation tendency of secrecy rate more clearly. Fig. 10 shows that the averaged SINR of FUs versus the transmit power of the MBS when there is an eavesdropper wiretapping MU 1 . Due to symmetry, we only need to evaluate the averaged SINR of the FU in one cooperative femtocell, and we assume the SINR requirement of FUs in STB-JMF scheme is 0.60. From Fig. 10 , it is observed that the SINR of FUs in STB-JMF achieves its optimum and is significantly superior to that in STB-SMF. We can also conclude that the SINR constraints (24d) in STB-JMF hold with equality. But for the STB-SMF scheme, as the transmit power of the MBS increases, the SINR of FUs goes down dramatically because more interference is introduced at FUs. Fig. 11 shows the averaged SINR of each FU versus the transmit power of each FBS when there is an eavesdropper wiretapping MU 1 . Similarly, the SINR requirement of FUs in STB-JMF is set as 0.60. We can also see that STB-JMF has advantages related to the averaged SINR of FU. It is worth noting that when the transmit power of each FBS is relatively low, e.g., around 20 dBm, the SINR constraint in STB-JMF could not be satisfied and thus there is no optimal solution. Hence, we slightly decrease the SINR requirement of FUs to 0.5 to ensure that the optimization problem can be solved. So in Fig. 11 , at the point of 20dBm, we can see the averaged SINR decreases slightly. However, from Fig. 10 and 11 , we can clearly see that the benefit of STB-JMF is to maximize secrecy rate of the wiretapped MU while maintaining QoS for all related FUs and the intended MU.
B. Performance of the Proposed Schemes

C. Impact of Artificial Noise (AN) on the Proposed Schemes
AN plays an important role in the physical layer security and may achieve substantial secrecy performance in some scenarios. In what follows we provide some simulations to verify whether AN is still beneficial for our schemes. To this end, AN is introduced into the STB-OM, the STB-SMF and the STB-JMF in these simulations. Furthermore, except for the beamforming schemes proposed in this paper, we also present two additional schemes for the purpose of comparison in these simulations, which are the "joint beamforming and AN design", as well as the "beamforming design with random AN".
Let us consider the broadcast channel as an example, then the optimization problem of "joint beamforming and AN design" can be expressed as
where SINR m and SINR E are the received SINRs at MU m and at the eavesdropper E, respectively. These SINRs are given by
where z is the AN vector. Hence, we can solve this optimization problem using Algorithm 1 proposed in this paper. Note that this model mimics the effect of AN in the STB-OM. On the other hand, considering the "beamforming design with random AN" for the broadcast channel, we transmit random AN and the optimized beamforming vectors at the MBS. The optimization problem is similar to (34) except that the optimization variables are only {w m } M m=1 , which do not include z.
Note that the STB-SMF and the STB-JMF rely on an interference channel. For simplicity, we only consider the typical scenario where there are two transmitters each having four antennas, two receivers each having a single antenna and one single-antenna eavesdropper trying to wiretap one of the transmitters, as shown in Fig. 12 .
We present the simulation results for the broadcast channel (as shown in Fig. 13 ) and for the interference channel (as shown in Fig. 14) . From Fig. 13 and Fig. 14, we can see that the secrecy rate of the system is almost the same for the proposed schemes whether there exists AN (joint design) or not. Therefore, we can conclude that transmitting AN using the additional N M − M dimensions does not have any significant impact on the performance of the proposed schemes. This is because in the proposed STB-OM scheme, we assume that there are multiple MUs, thus the MBS has to transmit multiple data flows. Therefore, the STB-OM relies on a broadcast channel. At the eavesdropper, the data from other legitimate MUs can be regarded as interference. For the STB-SMF and the STB-JMF, the data from FBSs can also be treated as interference. These interferences are essentially equivalent to the special ANs imposed on the eavesdropper.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the physical-layer security schemes in a two-tier downlink HetNet. On the basis of the two suggested spectrum allocation strategies, the OSA and the SONOSA, three STB schemes, i.e., STB-OM, STB-SMF and STB-JMF, have been proposed to maximize the secrecy rate of the eavesdropped user. According to various considerations of the QoS requirements of the legitimate users, the three proposed secrecy schemes adopt different degrees of collaboration among MBS and its cooperative FBSs. In particular, the complicated nonconvex STB optimization problems have been solved by problem reformulations with SDP and SOCP techniques. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed schemes. For the future work, it would be interesting to consider the scenario where multiple eavesdroppers and/or targeted MUs exist in the HetNet. Additionally, the robust STB schemes in the context of imperfect CSI may be investigated.
APPENDIX PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The maximization problem (32) can be equivalently transformed into
Tr(H E X 1 ) (37a) 
Tr(H n,nk X nk ) ≥ γ nk K t=1, t =k
Tr(H n,nk X nt )
Tr(H p,nk X pt )
Tr(H nk X m ) + ζ ,
Tr(H m X m )
Tr(H n,1 X nk ) + ζ ,
M m=2
Tr(H E X m )
Tr(H n,E X nk ) + ζ = 1,
X m , X nk 0, ζ > 0.
It is easy to verify that Problem (37) satisfies the Slater's condition. Then, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are the sufficient and necessary optimality conditions. Some KKT conditions needed in the proof are expressed as follows: Note that (38a), (38c) and (38e) have a similar structure, hence we only focus on the proof of rank(X * 1 ) = 1. rank(X * m ) = 1, m ∈ [2, M ], and rank(X * nk ) = 1, n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1, K], can be proved by using the same method.
If X * 1 = 0, the resultant secrecy rate is zero, which is trivial. Then, we have X * 1 = 0. According to (38b), the rank of G * 1 must be less than or equal to n − 1, i.e., rank(G * 1 ) ≤ n − 1.
An important observation is that with the optimal solution, the power constraints (37b) and (37c) have to be satisfied with equality [42] . Therefore, we have a * > 0 and a * n > 0, n ∈ 
where V 
where the equation a holds true relying on the following fact rank(B) = rank(AB) = rank(BC) = rank(ABC), (42) where A m×m and C n×n are both non-singular matrices, and B m×n is an arbitrary matrix. From (39) and (41), we have rank(G * 1 ) = n − 1. According to (38b), we have rank(X * 1 ) ≤ dim(N (G * 1 )) = n − rank(G * 1 ) = 1. Since X * 1 = 0, we obtain rank(X * 1 ) = 1. 
